This paper surveys the literature on how democracy affects economic growth. The paper first presents descriptive statistics and brief case-descriptions to illustrate how democracy and dictatorship may affect growth. Thereafter, the paper evaluates five central arguments on democracy and growth, before it surveys empirical studies on the relationship. Furthermore, the paper highlights critical methodological challenges, and draws implications for constructing valid models for empirical research on the topic. The review shows there is still disagreement over whether democracy enhances growth or not. Nevertheless, in the light of more recent studies, using more proper methodological approaches and more data than previous studies, two trends are recognizable: First, the hypothesis that democracy reduces economic growth is refuted by recent studies. Second, the hypothesis that democracy has no effect on growth, although still widespread in the academic community, seems less plausible today than it did ten or twenty years ago. Several recent studies show that democracy has positive effects on growth, although these effects are 'indirect' in the sense that democracy affects growth through, for example, enhancing human capital or strengthening the protection of property rights.
Democracy and economic growth; hypotheses and patterns in the data
This article reviews a selection of theoretical arguments and empirical results from the literature on whether and how democracy affects economic growth. Despite an increasing number of studies arguing and finding that democracy may have substantial economic benefits, the review makes clear that there is no consensus on whether democracy enhances economic growth or not. For instance, several policy makers and academics seem to believe that an authoritarian regime is needed for promoting economic development, particularly in relatively poor countries. Proponents of this hypothesis, sometimes referred to as the 'Lee Thesis' (Sen 1999, 15) , often back it up by highlighting the experiences of a modest set of fast-growing dictatorships, notably including the East Asian tiger states, Pinochet's Chile and present-day China. A different position is that there is likely no systematic effect of democracy on economic growth, or at least that we do not know whether democracy has an effect. This 'agnostic position' finds support in a number of thorough statistical studies, with Przeworski et al. (2000) being perhaps the most central contribution, and is widespread among prominent political scientists. Diamond (2008, 96) , for example, states the 'evidence is murky' for the hypothesis that democracy enhances economic development, while Tsebelis (2002, 70) considers it a surprising fact that there is no evidence of democracy increasing development. Despite this, several more recent statistical studies have found that democracy indeed enhances growth. Thus, the results on democracy's effect on growth vary between different studies.
Democracy correlates with economic growth
What is clear, however, is that democracy is positively correlated with economic growth when considering data from all regions of the world combined. Of course, this does not imply that democracy has a positive effect on growth. For example, there may be factors those affect both regime type and growth systematically, such as specific histori-cal patterns, other political-institutional variables or geographical factors (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2008) . Moreover, the correlation may also be due to economic growth affecting the prospects for democratization and democratic stability (e.g. Przeworski and Limongi 1997) . Nevertheless, Figure 1 shows the smoothed five-year average annual GDP per capita growth rates, based on data from Maddison (2006) , for relatively democratic and relatively dictatorial countries from 1855 to 2003. I have used the Polity Index (PI) (Marshall and Jaggers 2002) to classify regimes. The PI ranges from -10 to 10, and scores countries according to competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, and competitiveness and regulation of political participation; all countries with PI-scores ≥ 6 are categorized as democracies.
Figure 1: The figure shows smoothed five-year average GDP per capita growth for relatively democratic (Polity-index≥ 6) and relatively dictatorial countries from 1855 to 2003. Source: Reference removed, based on data from Maddison (2006) and Polity IV. Figure 1 shows that dictatorships have, on average, very seldom outgrown democracies with a large margin, and this is despite the dramatically changing composition of the 'club of democracies' during this almost 150 year long interval. During the recovery from the Great Depression in the 1930s, the world's dictatorships had higher growth than the more struggling democracies, which were mainly located in North America, the Pacific and Northwestern Europe. This was the period when the Soviet Union industrialized rapidly under Stalin's 5-year plans, and Germany experienced relatively speedy recovery from the depression under Hitler. However, this is more the exception than the rule, with another exception being a few years with very low growth in democratic countries around the end of World War I. From 1850 onwards, democracies have rather, on average, mainly had about equal to or higher growth rates than dictatorships. This was the case at the end of the 20th century, during the 'third wave of democratization' (Huntington 1991) , but also in earlier years when the group of democracies was less numerous, like in the 1850s-70s and the early and mid-1920s. Although the growth-differences between democracies and dictatorships shown in Figure 1 may seem modest, even such differences produce large disparities in income over time: If two countries started out equally rich in 1855, and one had a one percentage point higher growth rate, the faster-growing country would have been between four and five times as rich as the slower-growing in 2003. widely applied in the literature on democracy's effect on growth. In contrast with the PI, the FHI incorporates also civil liberties and may be considered a measure of a more extensive democracy concept (see, e.g. Munck and Verkuilen 2002) .
1 The FHI ranges from 1 Indeed, Krieckhaus (2004) finds that the choice of democracy measure may impact on estimates of democracy's effect on growth. In particular, he finds that the FHI more often yields a positive estimated effect on growth than the PI does.
(most democratic) to 7 (most dictatorial).
Cyprus ( Figure 2: The figure shows average annual GDP per capita growth along the y-axis and average FHI-score (1972 FHI-score ( -2000 along the x-axis. Source: Reference removed, based on data from Penn World Tables and Freedom House. Figure 2 shows a negative correlation between the FHI and economic growth over this particular 30-year period, and hence a positive correlation between democracy and growth. The figure it also shows very large variation in growth rates among regimes with approximately similar average FHI scores. This goes especially for countries run by the most dictatorial regimes. Indeed, it is fairly well-established that dictatorships vary a lot more in their economic growth performances than democracies do (Przeworski et al. 2000; Rodrik 2008; Besley and Kudamatsu 2008) , and several studies have investigated the potential sources of this variation (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson 2006a; Besley and Kudamatsu 2008; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gandhi 2008; Jones and Olken 2005; Knutsen 2011d; Wright 2008) . I'll return to this issue below, but let me here present the experiences of Singapore and Zaire to illustrate how different two non-democratic countries may be in terms of economic policy selection and economic outcomes:
1.2.1 Singapore Figure 2 shows that Singapore was one of the fastest-growing countries from 1970 to 2000, and the country has been classified as a 'Growth Miracle' (Przeworski et al. 2000) and as an 'Asian Tiger Economy' (Young 1995) . Singapore was ruled for many years by Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, who has given name to the 'Lee Thesis', and vigorously defended that an authoritarian regime is needed in developing countries to boost economic development (Sen 1999) . If one wants to selectively pick evidence for the Lee Thesis, Singapore seems to be the perfect case. The regime, led by the People's Action Party (PAP), managed to maintain domestic political stability in an ethnically fractionalized city state and oversee an impressive growth of the Singaporean economy. The city state developed rapidly from an economy based on the transhipment of goods produced and resources extracted elsewhere under British colonial rule (see, e.g. Huff 1994 ) to an industrialized economy, and then further to a center for finance and high-tech production.
Case studies of the Singaporean economy point to the key role the regime played for economic growth by promoting a set of specific economic policies (e.g. Huff 1994; Lim 1983; Bellows 1989) . For example, the regime supported strong protection of property rights, also for foreign investors, and enhanced investment and saving through a wide variety of means. Subsidized credit and provision of cheap land areas for large companies were among these, but also the politically induced low wages likely enhanced the savings and investment rates. The regime furthermore contributed to economic development by providing excellent infrastructure projects, like the city's subway network, and by expanding education and health services. The regime also actively engaged in industrial policy that seems to have worked quite well, at least in many instances, in terms of spurring growth in sectors that were considered particularly beneficial for overall economic development (see Parayil 2005) . Another crucial factor underlying Singapore's economic development was the well-functioning economic institutional environment, earning Sin-gapore top marks on different business environment-, corruption-, and property rights indexes. Importantly, such economic institutional aspects are not exogenous, but endogenous to political decision making.
Singapore experienced an average GDP per capita growth rate of 6.4 percentage points between 1970 and 2000, as seen from Figure 2 . This implies an almost eightfold increase in GDP per capita over the period, during which the PAP regime maintained strict control over government and the vast majority of parliamentary seats (e.g. Sikorski 1996; Bellows 1989) . This control was in part due to repression of civil liberties and manipulation of rules related to the electoral process, and by harassing opposition politicians. Nevertheless, the PAP most likely has had, and still has, broad popular support, perhaps mainly due to effective economic policies.
Zaire (Democratic Republic of Congo)
Singapore's excellent economic management and economic performance after decolonization contrast starkly with the policies and outcomes in Zaire after decolonization.
The economic decline in Zaire was dramatic, and this was even before the civil wars and foreign incursions that ravaged the country around the turn of millennium. The dismal growth in Zaire/Congo from 1970 to 2000 is displayed in Figure 2 ; Zairian GDP per capita is estimated to have dropped by an astonishing 4.8 percentage points annually from 1970 to 2000. However, the decline in income and production may be overstated by publicly available statistics, as private actors withdrew production from the formal to the informal economy (Reno 1997; Kisangani 1998 
Five arguments on democracy and growth
In their seminal study, Przeworski and Limongi (1993) evaluated four theoretical arguments on the relationship between democracy and economic growth. These are only a subset of the arguments in the literature, but they are among the most important. The arguments highlight how regime type might matter for I) property rights, II) investment, III) autonomy of the state and IV) checks on predatory rulers, which may all in turn impact on economic growth. Below I take a fresh look at these arguments, including some new theoretical insights and relevant empirical findings from more recent research. I also present a fifth argument on democracy and technological change. As Przeworski and Limongi (1993) , I score the arguments after whether they seem to indicate that democracy increases or decreases growth relative to dictatorship.
I) Democracy and protection of property rights -democracy increases growth
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) assess the debate on democracy's economic consequences from the nineteenth century, finding that the right to vote and freedom of organization were widely perceived to have adverse effects on protection of private property rights, and thereby economic growth. 2 The underlying argument can be expressed also in modern political-economic language (see Meltzer and Richards 1981; Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006b ): Consider a hypothetical country where the median citizen's property entitlement is below the average property entitlement, and where property (only) can be redistributed progressively. There are aggregate economic costs related to redistributing property, for example because of tax distortions or disincentives for investment due to increased uncertainty. Under democracy, assuming one-dimensional politics, the median voter's preferred outcome would be a policy that redistributes property until the marginal personal gain of redistribution is equal to her share of the marginal national economic loss from redistribution. If costs related to redistributing property are not too high, there will be redistribution under democracy. However, in a right-wing authoritarian regime, where the median member in the regime's group of backers has a property entitlement above or equal to the average entitlement, there will be no progressive redistribution. 3 Although property will be more equally distributed under democracy, national income will be lower since property redistribution implies an overall economic cost.
However, the argument above provides a narrow account of the politics of property rights protection. If one, for example, relaxes the questionable assumption that property can only be redistributed progressively, there are strong counterarguments to the claim that democracy weakens property protection. Ruling elites may want to expropriate the property of both its richer and poorer subjects alike, and democracy is associated with several features those provide checks against such state-led expropriation. First, in democracies the politically advantaged will constitute a larger segment of the population; a larger group may internalize more of the negative incentive effects resulting from property rights violation on the overall economy, even if the group gains directly from redistributive activity (Olson 1993) . Second, there is more power dispersion in democracies, also between different state institutions, which reduces the possibility for single actors to enforce their will at the cost of others (North and Weingast 1989; North 1990 ). Third, confiscation of property with subsequent redistribution of property as private goods to political backers is also a more cost-effective survival-tactic in dictatorship, where the winning coalition supporting the ruler is smaller (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003 ).
Przeworski and Limongi recognize the multiplicity of arguments, and their overall as-sessment is that '[w]hile everyone seems to agree that secure property rights foster growth, it is controversial whether democracies or dictatorships better secure these rights' (Przeworski and Limongi 1993, 51). They further conclude that '[t]he idea that democracy protects property rights is a recent invention, and we think a far-fetched one' (Przeworski and Limongi 1993, 52) . I disagree with this conclusion. Democracies have historically followed a range of redistributive policies, but these have often taken other, and more productivity-enhancing, forms than expropriation and redistribution of property from rich to poor (e.g. North, Wallis and Weingast 2009). Granted, there are historical instances of both democratic and dictatorial regimes engaging in expropriation, and the effect of regime type on property rights protection may be contingent on different factors. For example, the 'classic' argument presented above indicates that democratic politicians'
incentives for extensive redistribution of property may increase when wealth is very concentrated among a few rich, and thus the income of the median voter is far below the average income level. Nevertheless, on net, democracy presents important safe-guards to excessive violations of property rights. Indeed, the most compelling argument for refuting Przeworski and Limongi's conclusion relates to the statistical studies conducted after Przeworski and Limongi's article was published; these studies find a positive effect of democracy on property rights protection (e.g. Leblang 1996; Adzera, Boix and Payne 2003; Clague et al. 2003; Knutsen 2011b ).
II) Dictatorship and investment -either way
Dictatorial regimes often suppress freedom of association, thus crippling the independent organization of unions. In the absence of independent unions, wages are lower, and relatively rich capital owners take a larger share of total income (e.g. Rodrik 1999a). When combined with the assumption that savings rates increase with income (The Kaldor Hypothesis), aggregate savings and thereby investment rates are expectedly higher in dictatorships. Furthermore, political accountability is lower under dictatorship, among others due to the lack of free and fair elections. This reduces pressures on leaders to channel re-sources to immediate public consumption. Instead, dictators can make long-term investments, independent of the desires of 'short-sighted electorates' (Przeworski and Limongi 1993 However, if one stretches the capital concept to include also human capital, democracies may have an advantage over dictatorships. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992, 417-418) estimated that human capital is at least equally important as an input to the economy as traditional physical capital. Although this is an uncertain and disputed estimate (e.g. Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 1997) , human capital is widely agreed among economists to be important for growth (Barro and Sala-i Martin 2004 
III) Dictatorship and autonomy of the state -democracy decreases growth
Scholars studying East Asia have often linked the fantastic economic performances of some Asian dictatorships to the autonomy of the dictatorial state: 'In this view, the key to the superior economic performance of the Asian "tigers" is "state autonomy," defined as a combination of the "capacity" of the state to pursue developmentalist policies with its "insulation" from particularistic pressures, particularly those originating from large firms or unions. This argument takes two steps: "state autonomy" favors growth, and "state autonomy" is possible only under authoritarianism' (Przeworski and Limongi 1993, 56) . Olson (1982) argues that democracies are prone to capture from special interest groups.
This may conceivably lead to policies that are incoherent with the interests of the broader populace; economic growth may be sacrificed for the protection of specific business sectors or pivotal voting blocs. In any case, such lobby processes will be associated with wasteful rent-seeking, which will detract financial resources and focus from more productive ventures (Grossman and Helpman 2001) . One argument is that politicians and bureaucrats are insulated from such pressures under authoritarianism and therefore better able to enact 'good' policies (e.g. Wade 1990 ). Certain microeconomic reforms, for example, improve the efficiency of resource allocation in the medium to long run, but an adjustment process towards an efficient equilibrium may be painful and certain previously privileged groups may lose out. Under democracy, the potential losers may be 'veto players' (Tsebelis 2002 ), who will block reform. Trade liberalization is often considered a particularly fitting example, where protected industries might block liberalization, even if the expected result from liberalization is an increase in national GDP. Under dictatorship, the dictator has the means to carry out such 'painful' reforms (but, see Rodrik 1999b).
Reform may also be conducted more speedily under dictatorship, since many procedural steps needed in democracy and time-consuming negotiation can be skipped.
There are counterarguments that modify the picture painted above. First, political competition could mitigate rent-seeking, and reduce the negative economic consequences of such practices, through various mechanisms. These vitally include reputation mechanisms and monitoring by voters, organizations and politicians in the opposition, which provide incentives for politicians motivated by staying in office to avoid socially wasteful rent-seeking (see, e.g. Wittman 1989 ). Second, even when taking the argument on autocratic regimes and state autonomy at face value, state autonomy alone is arguably insufficient for successful political decision making. Political and bureaucratic processes need to be 'embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies' (Evans 1995, 12) . Such embeddedness may suffer under dictatorship because of the regime's insulation from the general populace, and the lack of an organized civil society with extensive knowledge of local conditions. Local knowledge is important in order to achieve efficient implementation of political decisions, and dictators are likely to be at an information disadvantage (e.g. Sen 1999 ). Moreover, the assumption that dictators are indeed as autonomous as described above is questionable. Even without free and fair elections linking the regime to a broader electorate, no dictator can survive without the backing of specific groups, be it the party, the landlord elite or the military; every leader 'answers to some group that retains her in power: her winning coalition' (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 7) . The difference between democracies and dictatorships within this framework is therefore not the degree of autonomy of the regime, but the sizes and other characteristics of the winning coalition (and selectorate). The question of whether a small winning coalition is conducive to growth is different from the question of whether more state autonomy is conducive to growth. This may lead us to rethink the economic effects of dictatorial insulation from the general populace.
IV) Democracy and constraints on predatory rulers -democracy increases growth
According to Evans (1995, 45) that steal or confiscate socially productive resources for their own material benefit, but the point is more general; rulers might use strategies that are well-designed for achieving personal goals, but which reduce economic growth. One special case is when dictators want to minimize probability of being thrown out of office: If the dictator, for example, should happen to believe that modernization theory is correct, with economic growth and industrialization leading to a strong middle class and calls for democracy, the dictator will be better off not industrializing (see Robinson 1998; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006a) .
Another rational strategy could be to spend excessive amounts on a repressive apparatus instead of using resources for productive investments (see Wintrobe 1990; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006b ). In democracies, elections, free media, and independent courts provide checks and disincentives for predatory behavior.
Not all dictatorships are predatory. One reason is that dictatorships vary in terms of institutionalized checks and balances; some dictatorships for example have legislatures and parties that play at least some political role, also when it comes to constraining predatory behavior (see, e.g. Przeworski et al. 2000; Gandhi 2008; Wright 2008) . Moreover, rational dictators may not always see it in their long-term interest to act predatorily. Olson (1993) argues that dynastic regimes may refrain from predation because of their rulers' relatively long time horizon, and hence disincentives for reducing the size of the future tax base (see also McGuire and Olson 1996) . Furthermore, the willingness to engage in predatory behavior depends on how the dictators' survival probability is affected by predation, which depends on a set of contextual factors (see Knutsen 2011c). Moreover, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that dictators with relatively large winning coalitions may have incentives to provide public goods instead of engaging in predatory behavior, whereas Besley and Kudamatsu (2008) argue that winning coalitions likely to retain their positions if a particular dictator loses power may discipline the dictator to refrain from predatory behavior. Nevertheless, an extension of most of these arguments to include democracies, from institutional checks to size and autonomy of the winning coalition, indicate that democratic leaders will have even less incentive to engage in predatory behavior than dictators who rule under the conditions described above.
V) Democracy and technological change -democracy increases growth
Technological change is acknowledged by many economists to be the most important factor underlying long-term growth (see e.g. Romer 1990; Acemoglu 2008 Hence, one has to examine what empirical studies on the subject find.
Evaluation of the arguments; a quick summary

Empirical studies on democracy and economic growth
The relationship between democracy and economic growth has been intensively studied. Several small-n comparative studies and case studies have considered the effects of regime type on economic growth or related measures of economic performance (see, e.g. There are different problems that need to be overcome for statistical studies to produce valid estimates of a causal effect of democracy on growth. Obviously, statistical studies need to identify covariation that is substantial enough to likely not be a result of chance.
However, covariation between democracy and economic growth could be due to other variables affecting the two systematically (see, e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2008) , and statistical models need to incorporate such variables to mitigate the possibility of omitted variable bias. Furthermore, covariation between democracy and growth could also stem from eco-nomic growth being a cause rather than a consequence of democracy (see, e.g. Przeworski et al. 2000) ; in other words, democracy could be endogenous to growth. Such endogeneity is difficult to properly account for, although one easily implementable solution that takes us at least some way is to correctly model the temporal dimension; we know that effects do not precede causes. Actually, several early studies on democracy and growth used data on democracy measured far after the observed growth (see Krieckhaus 2004) , thus violating the conventional assumption about the time order of cause and effect. More generally, early studies were mainly based on cross-sectional averages, for example over a decade, which meant that results were in part based on relating democracy-scores late in the time period to growth early in the time period.
There are additional methodological challenges for properly estimating the effect of democracy on growth, such as dealing with sample-selection biases and not controlling for channels through which democracy affects growth, and I will return to these below. However, establishing (significant) covariation, ensuring that the covariation is non-spurious, and dealing with endogeneity, for example by properly modeling the time-order of cause and effect, are central elements for the identification of a causal effect.
Early statistical evidence
As mentioned, most early (before ca 1995) statistical studies on the relationship between democracy and growth were based on cross-country data and the use of ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions (see Sirowy and Inkeles 1990; Przeworski and Limongi 1993) .
Many of these studies found a negative effect of democracy on growth, a result that has not been replicated in more recent studies. However, among the 18 early studies surveyed by Przeworski and Limongi (1993) , there were an equal number of studies finding a positive significant effect of democracy as there were studies finding a negative effect. Przeworski and Limongi's (1993) article highlighted the many problematic aspects of using crosscountry OLS regressions for investigating the relationship, which contributed to raising the awareness of how important proper modeling of the relationship is. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) for example show that a significant relationship between democracy and growth could be due to selection effects, related to democracies and dictatorships dying more or less frequently dependent on the growth rate. These authors therefore suggest utilizing Heckman selection models (Heckman 1978) , despite the sensitivity problems associated with these models. Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) also review 13 studies of the relationship, and present the different theoretical debates. On the basis of their review, Sirowy and Inkeles are skeptical of any positive effect of democracy on growth. Brunetti (1997) reviews the cross-country regression evidence for five categories of political variables (democracy, government stability, political violence, policy volatility, and subjective perception of politics), and finds that democracy is the 'least successful' explanatory political variable. Brunetti surveys 17 studies and finds that '9 studies report no, 1 study a positive, 1 study a negative, 3 studies a fragile negative and 3 studies a fragile positive relationship between democracy and economic growth' (Brunetti 1997, 167) .
Seemingly, many scholars drew the implication from the above-mentioned influential review articles that there is no strong, or even no, relationship between political regime type and economic growth. However, this is not necessarily a valid implication. Different control variables, different statistical methods, different samples of countries, and different time-periods under study could contribute to the varying results (see, e.g. Krieckhaus 2004) . Indeed, the meta analysis in Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) finds that differences in model specifications explain a large share of the variation in results on democracy's effect on economic growth. Several of the early studies can with the benefit of hindsight be argued to have relied on inadequate statistical methods and short samples, at least by today's standard. With new computer software, more data, and a better understanding of the relationship due to a 'standing-on-shoulders' effect, there was still much to be said about the relationship between democracy and growth after the 20th century ended, and there still is today. Sensitive results in cross-country growth regressions are not restricted to the effect of political regime type. As Sala-i Martin (1997) and Levine and Renelt (1992) argue, only a moderate set of variables are very robust determinants of economic growth in cross-country growth regressions, one being capital investment.
This does not lead to the conclusion that only capital investment and a few other variables are important for growth. Indeed, the sensitivity analysis in Sala-i Martin (1997) shows that political and civil rights are among the variables that actually have relatively robust effects on economic growth, and these effects are positive.
More recent statistical evidence
From the mid-1990s and onwards, several researchers have tried out more well-suited research designs to elucidate a possible effect of democracy on growth. These studies have mainly reached two conclusions, either that there is no significant effect of democracy on growth, or that there is a significant positive effect. I will not review them all here (for an extensive list, see Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2008, 79) , but only highlight some that are important or illustrative because of different reasons.
In accordance with the discussion above, Leblang (1997, 463) criticizes many earlier studies for having neglected the temporal dimension when studying the effect of democracy on growth. He uses a pooled cross-section -time-series approach, and lags the dependent variable to reduce the possibility of reverse causation driving the results. Leblang finds a positive and significant effect of democracy on growth. Later studies have also tended to rely on cross-section -time-series data. Helliwell (1994) employs an instrumental variable approach, and utilizes historical democracy values as an instrument for present values. He thereby reduces the possibility of endogeneity bias driving the results, for example because of growth influencing regime type. Helliwell does not find a significant effect of democracy on economic growth, but there may be problems with the appropriateness of the instrument used; the instrument could violate the exclusion restriction since a history of democratic governance may impact on growth. According to Gerring et al. (2005, 324) , '[i]f democracy matters for growth today, it is reasonable to assume that this effect stems from a country's regime history as well as its current status.
The distant past may have contemporary effects. Democracy is thus best considered as a stock, rather than level, variable'. Gerring et al. (2005) find a relatively robust and positive effect of 'democratic stock' on economic growth.
The perhaps most cited study on the relationship between democracy and economic growth is Przeworski et al. (2000) . This very thorough empirical study investigated the effect of democracy on growth in a sample of more than 4000 country-years from 1950 to 1990, using a dichotomous democracy measure (ACLP) as operationalization of regime type. Their main conclusion is that '[i]n the end total output grows at the same rate under the two regimes' (Przeworski et al. 2000, 179) , and this result is relatively consistent when using different estimation methods. Note, however, that this is total output, and not output per capita; the study does find some evidence that democracies are associated with slightly higher GDP per capita growth. The study also identfies the pattern mentioned above, namely that there is much more variation in growth between different dictatorships than between democracies. Robert Barro's studies on the determinants of economic growth are also among the most cited studies investigating the effect of democracy on growth (e.g. Barro 1996 Barro , 1997 ). Barro's work is methodologically of high quality in many ways (but, see De Haan 2007). However, Barro investigated only the direct effects of democracy through controlling for an extensive list of variables, including several that are more plausible as channels through which democracy affects growth. Thus, Barro found no linear effect of democracy on economic growth, but did find a hump-shaped relationship. According to Barro's analysis, semi-democratic regimes have higher economic growth than both more dictatorial and more democratic regimes. However, other studies have failed to replicate this result (Krieckhaus 2004; Knutsen 2011c ).
There have been several analyses of the democracy-growth relationship also after 2000. These analyses have been using new data, as well as different measures of democracy and different models from those used in Przeworski et al. (2000) . For example, Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein (2005) found that 'low-income democracies consistently outpace their autocratic counterparts on a wide range of development indicators' (Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein 2005, 63) , including economic growth. One of their main findings is that when excluding the four East Asian Tigers, whose inclusion in the sample 'skews the overall growth rate of authoritarian countries' (Halperin, Siegle and Weinstein 2005, 32) , democracies have much higher growth rates than dictatorships. However, systematically excluding countries from the sample is methodologically problematic and the study also relies on OLS cross-section methods. The studies by Baum and Lake (2003) and Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) are more convincing methodologically. These studies find no direct effect of democracy, but still find that democracy increases growth through specific channels. Both studies indicate that democracy increases growth mainly by enhancing human capital accumulation. Baum and Lake (2003) (Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2008, 63) . Hence, there is a quite large spread in the literature when it comes to the sign of the effect of democracy on economic growth.
Interestingly, the sensitivity analysis in Krieckhaus (2004) indicates that the time-period under study, the set of control variables entering the regression model, the measure of democracy used, and the data source for economic growth matter for results. 4 However, the above-noted divergence in results does not imply that there is no effect of democracy. As Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008, 78) point out, 'most of the differences in results are due to either sampling error or differences in the research process', and this is also indicated, for example, by the results in Krieckhaus (2004) . This should lead to the conclusion that studies using extensive samples and proper model specifications and estimation techniques should be given a larger weight in our overall judgement on whether democracy likely affects growth. One important methodological point, discussed below, is to not include control variables in democracy-growth regressions that presumably represent channels through which democracy affects growth. Much of the literature has done exactly this, and Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) uses this fact to tease out the likely indirect effects of democracy on growth. They find that democracy has no 'direct' effect, but rather affects growth positively through increasing human capital and economic freedom, and through reducing political instability and inflation.
Moreover, there is some evidence that democracy reduces growth through expanding the size of the public sector and through reducing economic openness, but these results are not as robust as the positive indirect effects of democracy listed above.
Moreover, Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) find that region-specific and timespecific effects are important for the democracy-growth relationship (see also Krieckhaus 2004 Krieckhaus , 2006 . Since the estimated effect of democracy on growth depends on the time period studied, researchers should be wary of generalizing from short samples. However, 4 For example, Krieckhaus finds that the effect of democracy on growth was likely to be positive significant in models drawing on data from the 1980s, and negative significant in models applying data from the 1960s (see also Knutsen 2011a) . Notably, Figure 1 shows that the 1960s is one of the few time periods from after 1850 when democracies on average have not outpaced dictatorships in terms of economic growth. Krieckhaus (2004) also finds that the effect of democracy on growth was more likely to be positive when using economic growth data from the World Development Indicators than from the Penn World Tables. The   latter empirical research in this area, likely because of data availability issues, has very often relied on quite short samples. One exception is the study conducted by Persson and Tabellini (2006) , which includes data back to 1860. These authors study the effect of regime transitions, and find evidence indicating that transitions into democracy increase growth, and that the effect is quite substantial. This is equivalent to the result from Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) , who draw on less extensive time series. Another exception in terms of sample size is Knutsen (2011c) , which investigates the effect of level of democracy on growth based on a data set including around 10 000 observations. These observations stem from more than 150 countries, with some time series going back to 1820. Some of the models control both for country-fixed effects and for the possible endogeneity of democracy to economic growth, and the results indicate a quite robust, positive effect of democracy. Many of the point estimates indicate effects of going from least to most democratic of around one percentage point extra annual GDP per capita growth, or more.
The above-mentioned studies drawing on data from the last two centuries actually correspond quite well with evidence from earlier time periods. De Long and Shleifer (1993) study the period from 1050 to 1800, and find that regime characteristics explain much of the variation in economic dynamism among Western European cities and regions. More specifically, they argue that European cities in polities with more extensive political and civil liberties likely grew faster economically than cities in polities with less extensive liberties. Although perhaps none of these polities would reach a modestly high democracy threshold according to today's standards, some of them scored systematically higher than others on democracy-relevant dimensions like competition for public offices, participation, horizontal accountability, and civil liberties (see De Long and Shleifer 1993, 679-684) . The more democratic polities also incorporated the economically most dynamic cities; the Northern Italian city-states in the Renaissance, Britain after the Glorious Revolution, the city states in the Low countries before Habsburg rule, and the Dutch cities again after having revoked the Spanish were the most dynamic economic centers in their respective time periods (see also North 1981; Maddison 2006 (Rodrik 2008 ). This is not to say that there is little variation for democracies; electoral system and form of government may for example systematically impact on selection of fiscal and other economic policies, and thus contribute to differences in growth between democracies (see, e.g. Persson and Tabellini 2003; Gerring, Thacker and Moreno 2009; Knutsen 2011e) . Furthermore, very young democracies tend to perform worse than democracies that have existed for a few years, not only in terms of growth (Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008) but also in terms of protecting property rights (Clague et al. 2003) and controlling corruption (Rock 2009a) .
Despite this, the variation in economic growth is far higher for dictatorial regimes.
Possibly due to the larger concentration of power, individual leaders and their characteristics have a sizeable impact on economic growth in dictatorships but not in democracies (Jones and Olken 2005) . Furthermore, there is considerable institutional variation among dictatorial regimes (see, e.g. Hadenius and Teorell 2007) , and institutional factors play a role in explaining the variation in growth. For example, the existence of parties and legislatures in dictatorships have been found to enhance economic growth (Gandhi 2008; Wright 2008) . One interpretation is that such institutional structures may constrain dictators (Wright 2008) , and thereby take away their opportunities to pursue 'bad policies' (Robinson 1998 4 Conclusion with some thoughts on empirical modeling
As highlighted above Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2008) (Clague et al. 2003) and corruption (Rock 2009a) , comes with a substantial time lag. Hence, as discussed above, properly modeling the temporal dimension is important for identifying causal effects.
2) As discussed, mitigating the possibility of observed correlation between democracy and growth being spurious is also critical for identifying a potential effect. Hence, one should control for certain geographical, cultural and political-historical factors; such factors affect economic outcomes, like long-term growth rates, and they are also often correlated with political regime type (see Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001; Acemoglu et al. 2008; Engerman and Sokoloff 1997; Landes 1998; Pomeranz 2000; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004) . One should either try to explicitly incorporate the most plausible such factors in the model, or apply fixed effects models that control for countryfixed effects. Time-specific effects should also be controlled for.
3) Since economic factors may affect the probability of being a democracy (e.g. Prze- of democracy on growth. Using more extensive data sets is thus one solution. But, since there will still be missing data, multiple imputation procedures may be used to further mitigate possible sample-selection biases (see Honaker and King 2010) .
To sum up, the literature on democracy and economic growth contains studies that show no effect, a negative effect, and a positive effect of democracy on growth. Yet, there has been progress in the field. Over the last two decades, data coverage on political and economic variables have expanded dramatically. Simultaneously, there have taken place methodological and software developments that allow researchers to conduct more proper tests of the potential effect of democracy on growth. To my knowledge, no recent study using large data samples and proper statistical model specifications find a negative effect of democracy on growth. Hence, it is fair to say the Lee Thesis is discarded by the available evidence, although it lingers on in policy communities, the media, and even in some academic circles. The alternatives have thus been narrowed down to two: either there is no effect of democracy on growth, or democracy enhances growth. In my view, the latter alternative seems increasingly plausible, in the light of recent evidence, despite the fact that the very thorough and much-cited study by Przeworski et al. (2000) is often taken into account for the former alternative. Thus, my best guess would be that democracy, in general, enhances economic growth.
